Sixth Distinction. Fourth Part. Article Two. About the Character because of which Baptism is Posited as Unrepeatable

Overview of Questions

186. As to the last main point, about character [n.154], I ask three questions: first whether in baptism a character is impressed; second what it is, namely whether it is some absolute form; third where it is, namely whether in the essence of the soul, or in a power and in what power.

Question One. Whether a Character is Impressed in Baptism

187. As to the first [n.186] argument is made that there is not:

Because circumcision did not impress a character; therefore neither does baptism.

The consequence is plain, because baptism has succeeded to circumcision, and as a remedy against the same sickness; therefore a similar effect belonged to both. The antecedent is plain, because the character of circumcision would have been of the same idea as the character of baptism, and then it would follow that someone circumcised would not have had to be baptized, because two accidents of the same species cannot be in the same thing; the consequent is false, as is plain above d.3 n.131.

188. Again, faith distinguishes the faithful from the infidel, and charity the son of perdition from the son of the Kingdom (according to Augustine On the Trinity XV.18 n.32; cf. Matthew 13.38). And these are the most noble things in the soul, and yet they do not impress any distinctive character; therefore, much more does baptism not do so.

189. Again, if a character be impressed, it is not a substance, because it arrives after perfect being does; nor is it a per se an accident or one that is necessarily inherent, because it is not caused by the principles of the subject; therefore, it would be an accident per accidens. But every such accident is separable and exists contingently; therefore, a character would be separable from the soul, the opposite of which is held by all those [William of Auxerre, Bonaventure, Aquinas, Richard of Middleton] who posit a character in the soul.

190. To the contrary:

Dionysius, Ecclesiastical Hierarchy ch.2, says that “to him who comes to baptism a seal of the sacrament is given by the priest” - which is only the character.

191. Again, Damascene Orthodox Faith ch.82 says that “through baptism there comes to be in us regeneration and a seal” - by ‘seal’ meaning a character.

192. Again, baptism is an unrepeatable sacrament, from the preceding question [nn.158, 163-166];     therefore , it impresses some indelible effect, because if every effect of it could be destroyed, baptism could be repeated; but it has no indelible effect save character; therefore etc     .

I. To the Question

193. Here must be understood that a question ‘whether something is’ presupposes as manifest only what is asserted by the name, as is plain from the question about the definition of a sacrament in general, d.1 nn.181-187.

194. First, then, let the meaning of the name ‘character’, according to which there is here question or discussion of it, be set down; second let inquiry be made about the principal thing, whether anything of this sort is in the soul through reception of baptism.

A. About the Meaning of this Name ‘Character’

195. About the first (by moving from word from word), ‘character’ signifies the same as ‘figure’, and thus is it taken in Hebrews 1.3: where we have ‘the figure of his substance’, in Greek is put ‘the character’. And in this way do we call characters the figures by imposition that letters are written in; and in this way we call characters (in chants and the like) certain protracted figures and in this way is ‘the figure of the beast’ in Revelation 13.16-17, 14.9 etc., taken to be a figure on the forehead or on the hand, which signifies that the person so marked belongs to the family of the beast.

196. Now more generally ‘character’ is taken for a sign, and in this way baptismal washing can be called a character, because it is a certain sign.

197. The form also of the words in a sacrament can be called a character, as the Master speaks of character in this distinction (as said in the previous question [n.162]).

198. But, setting all these aside, theologians, when speaking of character as we are speaking of it in the issue at hand, commonly conceive by ‘character’ something spiritual impressed by God on the receiver of a non-repeatable sacrament.

199. From this idea of the name some properties of character follow, two of which are common to it and to any form (namely that it is a form assimilating one to someone else who has it, and that it is a form distinguishing one from someone else who does not have it), and others are special, one of which is that it is a sign commemorative of a sacrament received, another is that it is sign conforming one to Christ, whose sacrament is received, and also imposing obligation on one, in the way that he who receives a sacrament is obligated by reception of it.

200. Now from this idea of the name it is plain that character is not grace or any infused virtue (as faith or hope and charity), because such virtues are not always impressed on him who receives an unrepeatable sacrament (as on someone pretending), but character is always impressed.

201. This is also plain from a certain other condition that those who commonly speak about character attribute to it, namely that it is indelible; but these virtues are not indelible, as is plain about someone sinning mortally, in whom the virtues do not remain.

B. About the Impressing on the Soul of Character thus Understood

202. The second main point [n.194] is whether something possessing this idea of the name and of the properties is impressed on the soul of the one baptized.

1. First Opinion: Neither by Natural Reason nor from Things Believed can it be Proved that a Character is Present in the Soul

203. It is said here that there is not [a character in the soul].

204. And the mode of stating it is this: just as nothing real is impressed on other consecrated things that do not receive formal sanctity in their consecration, so since, in the issue at hand, the recipient of the sacrament does not receive formal sanctity, no real form necessarily is impressed on him. The proof of the likeness is that other sanctified things that do not receive formal sanctity are not distinguished from the man as to the act, when from this act he does not receive sanctity. Now the assumption about these other things is plain in the case of a sanctified chalice, because it receives no real form, as well as a dedicated church and blessed water and priestly garments and the like.

a. First Reason

205. Argument for this conclusion:

First as follows: just as, following natural reason, more things are not to be posited whose necessity is not clear from things known by natural reason [supra d.1 nn. 294, 300], so about what is believed or the sacraments more things are not to be posited whose necessity does not appear necessary, or needing to be posited, according to the faith. But such a necessity for an impressed form does not appear even according to things that are believed about baptism.

206. The proof of the minor is that neither does Sacred Scripture express that this is necessary in baptism, nor do the saints explicitly express it, nor does it follow evidently from the truth believed about baptism, because the whole truth of baptism consists in the visible sacrament and the invisible effect; and when Augustine specifies the invisible effect, he commonly calls it grace [e.g. Sermon 994, ‘On the day of the Pasch,’ I ch.1 n.1, et al.]

α. Objection

207. Here the response is made that the Saints do sufficiently hand on a tradition about the character in the way we speak of it, as is adduced from Dionysius and Damascene [nn.190-191].

β. Response to the Objection

208. But these authorities seem to be only verbal, and not to the intention of the saints -

209. [Proof that the authorities are only verbal] - for as is evident from looking at the translation and exposition of the Abbot of Vercelli,Abbot Thomas Gallus, who wrote a paraphrase/exposition of this work of Dionysius; the translation is not by him but was mistakenly attributed to him. ⁴⁷ Dionysius Ecclesiastical Hierarchy ch.2, on the words cited [n.190], where the Abbot says according to that translation: “The divine beatitude receives him [the one baptized], thus drawn upward, to participation in himself, and hands over of his own light to him, as by a certain sign, making him divine and in communion with those who remain in God.” And there follows there, “A holy sign from the hierarch, a seal given to the one who comes forward,” where some add from another translation words of this sort, “To him who comes to baptism is given by the supreme priest a sacred seal.”

210. Likewise he [the one who holds this view, n.190] adduces this from Damascene IV ch.1 as follows, that “through baptism is given to us regeneration and a seal;” by seal, according to them, is understood character. In the same place Damascene says of the three [qualities of the sign of the cross]Damascene, Orthodox Faith, ch.84, “This cross is given to us as a sign on the forehead, in the way circumcision was given to Israel. This is the helmet and shield and trophy against the devil; these are the seal.” ⁴⁸, “as circumcision was for Israel,” and after it, “and a seal.”

211. [Proof that they are not adduced to the intention of the authors] - These authorities [of Dionysius and Damascene] are not adduced to the intention of the authors:

About the first [n.190] it is clear, because as the plain ground of the text has it, and as Vercelli expounds that part of ch.2, para. 6, Dionysius is making determination about a certain preamble to baptism, namely how, according to the rite of the Greeks in the primitive Church, the one to be baptized was first brought into the Church, and on his head the hierarch put his hand and put a sign on him, commanding the priests to register both him and his reception. That would happen long before the baptizing, as is plain from the procedure of the text there, because determination is made about the act of baptizing in para.17 there, under the letter R.

212. Whence too that text of Dionysius in the translation of Vercelli is adduced in truncated form [n.190]. For after premising “and hands over of his own light to him, as by a certain sign...and in communion with those who remain in God etc.” [n.209], he adds about them, “Whose is the holy sign, a seal given by the hierarch to the one who comes forward, and the saving registration by the priests.” ‘Whose’ - I say render singulars for singulars,That is, each singly of ‘those who remain in God’ received singly the same ‘holy sign’ or ‘seal’, and this they received long before baptism. Scotus’ point seems to be that the omission of ‘whose’ in the initial citation [n.209] gives the misleading impression that someone baptized receives an additional holy sign or seal. In fact, however, the true meaning is that everyone, those who were in communion before and he who has become so now, received the same sign or seal, and that this sign or seal, in context, was the laying of hands on the head and registration by the priests, and that it all preceded baptism. Hence it can have nothing to do with any sign or seal or ‘character’ impressed at baptism, and only the omission of ‘whose’ could insinuate otherwise. ⁴⁹ that is, ‘the holy sign’ of the light handed on, ‘a seal given by the hierarch’, namely the imposition of hands on his head; and that he be in communion with those who are divine the sign is ‘the saving registration of the priests’, namely those who register him and his reception, as received into the communion of Christians. - Now this imposition of hands and registration happened long before baptizing; therefore, in no way can these things said here be understood of any sign impressed in baptism.

213. The authorities from Damascene [nn.191, 210] are very ineptly adduced.

Because a part of one passage is conjoined to a part of another, with a sentence passed over that needs to be continued with the preceding part. For the text of Damascene runs thus: “Through baptism we take up the first fruits of the Holy Spirit,” and it is a verse there; and another verse follows, “and the beginning of a second life becomes regeneration for us,” and then follows at once, “sign and protection and illumination.”     Therefore , in no way does he mean to say that through baptism a seal is made for us, but that by baptism we take up ‘the first fruits of the Holy Spirit’ in the first verse, and in another clause that ‘regeneration is the beginning of life and a sign etc     .’ Therefore from this authority can be got only that baptism, or regeneration, is a sign, and not that through baptism a sign is made for us.

214. And the other authority from Damascene [n.210] is of no validity, for he is expressly speaking there of the cross when he says “It is given to us as a sign on the forehead, as circumcision was for Israel; for by it the faithful are distinguished from infidels;” and about the same cross there follows, “This is the helmet and shield and trophy against the devil, and a sign that the ravager not come near us.” He does not mean to say more than that the cross is impressed on us as a sign against the enemy - which is not relevant to the matter in hand.

215. And there is a confirmation of this, because Augustine, who only treated of what baptism was intended for (namely in On Baptism against the Donatists VI and On Baptism of Children III and On the Single Baptism and much in his commentary On John and On the Faith to Peter [actually by Fulgentius]), would not have kept silent about ‘character’ if it had been an immediate and necessary effect of baptism.

216. And if you say ‘he does not deny it’, I reply: for the matter in hand it is sufficient that he not affirm it, because it is supposed to be a matter for so great investigation that, if character had been a thing proper to baptism, he would have been express about it elsewhere. But as it is, he only distinguishes in baptism the ‘sacrament’, that is, something externally visible, and ‘the thing of the sacrament’, namely grace; nor does he ever say that someone pretending receives any ‘thing of the sacrament’ but only the ‘sacrament’; nor does he ever show that baptism is unrepeatable through such an impressed character.

217. Likewise too in Gratian, Decretum p.3 d.4: the authorities of the saints about baptism are collected, and it does not seem likely that none of them would have spoken about character if it had been so necessary an effect of baptism.

218. And what seems much to be of weight, the Master of the Sentences never spoke about the character according to that understanding,Lombard speaks of character in Sent. V d.6 ch.2 n.3 and d.24 ch.13 n.1, but not in the sense of its being a necessary effect of the sacrament. ⁵⁰ although however he diligently compiled the authorities of the saints about the matters he deals with.

b. Second Reason

219. Second, argument is given principally in the way following, and it returns to the same truth [n.205; d.1 n.300], namely that a plurality is not to be posited without necessity. And the argument is as follows: nothing in vain is to be posited in the works of God, because “God and nature do nothing in vain” [On the Heavens 1.4.271a33]; but a character according to this understanding [nn.198-199], if it be posited, is posited in vain.

220. Proof of the minor: first by comparison with the main effect of baptism, which is grace [n.198]; second by comparison with those effects that are attributed to character, namely to assimilate, to distinguish, etc. [n.199].

221. As to the first [n.220] the argument is as follows:

If [a character] is required as a disposition for grace, either then on the part of what receives or on the part of the agent. Not on the part of what receives, because a soul that does not have sin actually [sc. those just now baptized] is supremely disposed to receive grace; nor on the part of the agent, because the agent [sc. God] is of infinite virtue.

222. And if you say it is required as a permanent disposition for inducing, at some point later in time, an effect that is not induced at once (as for this purpose, that he who has, in pretense, been baptized may afterwards receive the effect of baptism) - against this as before [n.221]: a character is required for that later time (when he receives the ultimate effect of baptism) as a disposition either on the part of what receives or on the part of the agent, and the reasoning stands as before.

223. There is argument specifically for this, that God could, without such a sign, be present to the one baptized to cause the effect of baptism (after the pretense is removed), just as he would have been present in the baptism itself if the one baptized had not before been in pretense. And there is a confirmation, that the effect of baptism is not given to him who is supposed to have the character unless he truly repent; but by true penance, grace would, without such a form, be given.

224. As to the other effects [nn.220, 199] the proof of the point is that the one baptized could, without an inherent form, be assimilated to the baptized and distinguished from the non-baptized through receiving baptism, as is plain in many other cases (because someone professed in religion is assimilated to another who is professed, and distinguished from another who is not professed, not by some other form inherent in him after profession, but because he had such act [of profession] in the past).

225. In the same way about the third effect [in fact the fourth, n.199], namely that the sign is posited as configuring or obligating [the baptized] to Christ; for someone can be obligated to someone, and so be configured to him as to the obligation of configuring, without any inherent form; just as he who does homage to some lord is, after the homage, obliged to him to keep faith and so to a certain configuration, and someone professed is bound by his profession to be conformed or configured to his superior; and yet he who does not do homage or is not professed receives some absolute form to be a sign of configuration.

226. About the fourth effect [the third in n.199], namely that a sign commemorating the sacrament itself is posited, the argument is as follows: either because such a commemorative sign is posited in respect of the sacrament on account of the excellence of the sacrament in itself, or it is posited on account of some relation to others who may recognize from the sign the one signed.

227. Not in the first way, because faith and charity are more excellent than having received baptism, and yet they do not possess any commemorative sign after they have become present within.

228. Not in the second way, because either in comparison to God or to one’s neighbor; not as to God, because God would recognize, without any existent sign, him who has received the sacrament; not as to one’s neighbor, because either to the blessed in glory (for his greater glory in having the sign), or to the damned in hell (for his greater confusion who does not have such a sign). It is necessary to grant neither, because it is a greater glory for the blessed to have had an act of charity than to have received baptism, and it is a greater confusion for the damned to have fallen from charity than from the reception of baptism; and yet no commemorative sign for charity or a meritorious act is posited in the blessed or in the damned.

229. Now specifically about beatitude the argument is that, if the sign were in the haver of it for special excellence in glory, it would follow that only a priest among all Christians could have such an excellence in glory, because only a priest has all the characters. It would also follow that Christ would lack that excellence of glory, because he is not baptized thus with the baptism of Christ, because the baptism of John did not impress a character; nor was he a priest with the priesthood as it is conferred in priestly ordination, because he was not ordained by anyone; for equal reason neither was he confirmed with sacramental confirmation. It also follows that the holy Patriarchs and the Blessed Mother did not have that excellence in glory.

c. Third Reason

230. Again third, argument is made on the part of the gift in itself:

It does not seem probable that God would confer his gift on anyone who is not only in mortal sin but is mortally sinning in the very act.

231. And the proof of this is: “The works of God are perfect,” Deuteronomy 32.4, and therefore he cures no one whom he does not cure perfectly; for it is an impious thing to hope for pardon imperfectly from God; therefore, he gives no gift of his to anyone who is then actually sinning mortally. But someone who is pretending while receiving baptism is sinning mortally, because he is doing irreverence to the sacrament; therefore God does not, by virtue of this act in which he is sinning mortally, give him any special gift.

d. Fourth Reason

232. Again, every gift of God given to man either makes him graced or is freely given - understanding the ‘making him graced’ in this way: either actually or dispositively. Or more briefly it can be said that God gives no gift to anyone save either for that person’s good or for the Church’s good. This gift [sc. character] is not a gift freely given or a gift for the Church’s good (of which sort is the gift of tongues or other gifts the Apostle speaks of in II Corinthians 9.8-14 [also I Corinthians 12.4-11]); because it would be of no value save to him only who has it; it is also plain that no effect follows that is useful to the Church. But neither is it a gift that makes to be graced, because by this gift a person is not constituted in any degree of acceptation in respect of God. Nor too is such a gift conferred without grace and charity, because God heals perfectly.

e. Fifth Reason

233. Finally argument is made thus from the mode of being that is posited for character, because it is posited as indelible [n.201] - and this as follows: no form is present in the soul which God cannot destroy, because it is a lesser thing to destroy than to create, or at any rate there is no contradiction involved in saying that ‘a form created in the soul is destroyed from the soul’; therefore, if character is indelible, no such form is in the soul of the baptized.

f. Response to the Initial Arguments for the Opposite

234. According to this opinion [nn.203-204], the response to the two authorities [nn.190-191] adduced for the other side of the question is plain, because they are adduced badly and altogether not according to the intention of the authors, as is plain in the first reason for the opinion [nn.205-206, 208-218].

235. As to the reason for the first part introduced [n.192], about indelibility, I reply: the sacrament is not unrepeatable for the reason that it impress an indelible effect, but from divine ordination, as is said in the preceding question [n.163].

The reason can also be taken to the opposite: for a sacrament is more unrepeatable if it impress no form, because whatever form it impress, it could be deleted.

236. But if it is posited to be unrepeatable because it crosses over into the past, then the ‘indelible’ is preserved simply, because God could not, of his absolute power, make what is past not to have been past.

237. And if you take flight to the impressed form - since any form whatever can be destroyed, unrepeatability is simply not obtained. But if it be said that a past act is sign, since the past cannot be destroyed, that is, cannot not have been, it follows that the reason is simply one of impossibility.

2. Second Opinion: That there is a Character in the Soul can be Proved by the Authority of the Church and Various Elements of Congruence

238. One can say to the question in a second way that although ‘there is a character in the soul’ cannot be proved by natural reason, either universally (namely because it is necessary to grant that such a form is in the soul even because of the end), or in particular (by experience of some act or condition of an act manifesting that there is such a form in the agent who perceives his act - just as neither can this be proved of grace or charity, on which see Ord. III d.26 n.132, d.27 n.66; Ord. I d.17 n.126-129) -although, too, it cannot be proved from manifest things believed (whether those that are explicitly of the substance of the faith, or are contained in Scripture, or are manifestly deduced by the saints from things believed), because there appears no necessary relation of it to such believed things - yet a character can be posited, because neither is it repugnant to the soul itself to have such a form as character is described to be, nor consequently is it repugnant to God to be able to impress such a form on the soul.

239. But in order that it not be posited altogether in vain and without necessity, it is necessary to have some authority on which he may rest who does posit it, and then it will be easy to solve what is objected against it.

240. Now among the authorities of the saints in accord with this signification of ‘character’ that we are speaking about, there do not appear many express authorities, yet some are alleged:

241. Augustine On Baptism Against the Donatists VI ch.1 n.1, “It is sufficiently clear that a lamb, which had outside received the lord’s character, is when coming to safety corrected from going astray; however, let one acknowledge the lord’s character on it, since many wolves, who are seen within, impress a character on wolves.”A passage also quoted by Thomas Aquinas ST III q.63 a.1, and Richard of Middleton, Sent. IV d.5 princ.2 q.3. It reads more in full: “To have...and give and receive the sacrament of baptism is sufficiently clear to the pastors of the Catholic Church diffused through the whole world, by whom afterwards, with the authority of a plenary council at Carthage, the original custom was confirmed: that even a lamb that was going astray outside and had received the lord’s character outside from the deceiving plunderers of it, when coming to the safety of Christian unity, is corrected from going astray, freed from captivity, cured from the wound; yet the lord’s character on it is recognized rather than rejected, since that character is impressed by many, both wolves and on wolves, who are indeed seen inside; however, that they do not belong to the lamb, which is also one from many, is proved by the fruits of their morals.” ⁵¹

242. Ibid. I ch.1 n.2, “Just as someone baptized, if he have departed from unity, does not lose the sacrament of baptism, so someone ordained, if he have departed, does not lose the sacrament of giving baptism; for injury must not be done to any sacrament.”

243. In this authority [n.241] Augustine use the name ‘character’ several times, but it appears that nothing is to the purpose according to the signification of ‘character’ we are speaking about, because he says that ‘wolves impress a character on wolves’, which is more applicable to the sacrament of baptism than to any effect in the soul. Hence everywhere in this authority the term ‘character’, as to his intention, can be well taken for the effect of baptism, just as was said before [n.162] that the Master took ‘character’, in that definition there, for the form of baptism.

244. In brief, as is contained in Gregory IX, Decretals V tit.7 ch.9, ‘About Heretics’, “one must think about the sacraments of the Church the way the Roman Church thinks.”

245. Now the Roman Church seems to think that a character is impressed on the soul in baptism, as Innocent III says [ibid. III tit.42 ch.3], ‘About baptism and its effect’, “He who comes in pretense to baptism receives impressed the character of Christianity.” And in the same place near the end, “The sacramental operation does then impress a character, when it does not find the obstacle of a contrary will standing against it.” And if his first authority could be expounded by saying that the ‘character of Christianity’ is baptism itself, yet the second, which says ‘the sacramental operation also impresses a character’ seems to speak expressly of a character as of something impressed on the soul itself, the way we are speaking of it in the issue at hand.

246. On account, therefore, of the sole authority of the Church, as much as it helps for the present, one must posit that a character is impressed.

247. For this three congruences are possible.

The first is of this sort: it is congruous that for a perfect form some disposition is posited; grace is a perfect supernatural form; therefore it is congruous that there is for it some preceding supernatural form; such a form is character.

248. Second congruence is that it is congruous that God did not institute empty sacraments, at least for the New Law, which is perfect; therefore, it is congruous that his sacraments be received by no one without truly having some effect; but they do not always have grace, as is plain of someone in pretense; therefore some other effect.

249. The third congruence is that it is congruous that someone received into the family of Christ is distinguished from someone not received by something intrinsic to him; because although Christ could make distinction without such intrinsic thing, yet his distinction would be more perfect, both in itself and in comparison to the whole Church (namely the Church militant and triumphant), if it be done by some abiding intrinsic form than if it not be done so. Now, in the case of one who receives the sacrament, whereby entrance is made into the family of Christ, the distinguishing mark from him who does not receive it, and the mark that remains in him who does receive it, is posited to be a character.

250. Of these three congruences, the third is more reasonable because it is also specific to baptism.

251. The two others have this sort of probability, that if a character is posited, let it be posited in a way of such a sort as those congruences touch on.

252. Namely: according to the first [n.247] a disposition for grace is posited; for it is rational that, when two ordered forms are caused by the same agent in the same subject, this is not on an equality as to causation nor are they equally perfect, because let one be a disposition to the other, and this is not a more perfect to a more imperfect but the converse. Now character and grace are caused by God in baptism, and not on an equality in each way; therefore, since character is more imperfect, it is congruous that it is a disposition to grace, which is more perfect. - But yet this congruence does not prove that one must posit the sort of form as a disposition is, otherwise since in any sacrament whatever grace is conferred, a preceding disposition would be required in any sacrament whatever. However, by applying this reason [the first, n.247] specifically to baptism it gets a greater evidence, because the first sacrament conferring grace is baptism, and consequently in it should more be conferred a disposition to grace than in any other sacrament, because a disposition naturally precedes the form for which it is the disposition; and therefore there is no need that it be impressed thus in later sacraments.

253. But the second reason [n.248] is too universal, or more universal, because it is equally probative about any sacrament, because any sacrament is instituted so as not to be empty. But to posit that in the other sacraments there is some adornment corresponding to a character is altogether superfluous, as was touched on above in d.1 [n.329]. - And a reason can be formed about the other sacraments for the opposite, because the reason is not probative. For if someone who is equally in pretense can receive another sacrament the way someone in pretense receives baptism (which appears probable, because there seems no greater need of a determinate disposition for someone to receive the sacrament of baptism absolutely than for him to receive the sacrament of penance absolutely, and a recipient of the sacrament of penance absolutely in this respect, that a penitent in pretense receives altogether no invisible effect), then it is not necessary, for the truth of the sacrament, that someone baptized receive any invisible effect.

254. Thus briefly then, let the conclusion be held on account of the authority of the Church previously adduced [n.245]; and the two congruences, one about reception into the family of Christ [n.249] and the other about a disposition needing first to be conferred [n.247], are probable.

3. To the Arguments for the First Opinion

a. To the Argument about the Way of Positing a Character

255. To the arguments for the other opinion.

As to what is touched on first in the way of positing character [n.204], I say that other consecrated things do not receive a form inherent in them because they are not capable of it. But man is capable of grace and of some disposition or other for grace, and so when, because of his own impediment, he does not receive grace, he does yet receive the disposition - and that is a character.

256. And if it is objected: ‘in that respect in which a man does not receive sanctity formally he is not distinguished from those sanctified things that cannot receive sanctity formally (of which sort are a consecrated chalice and the like)’ - I reply: in the negation ‘not receive sanctity formally’ he is not distinguished from them, but he is distinguished from them in that he is capable not only of sanctity formally but of the disposition for it, and those others are not. And if he not reach the ultimate stage [sanctity formally] because of an impediment on his part, yet he does receive the preceding disposition.

b. To the First Reason

257. To the first reason, about the necessity of positing several things [nn.205-206], I say that although this cannot be proved with evident necessity from things believed, yet there is a necessity to posit what the Church posits. And there are the congruences of the sort before adduced [nn.247-249]. Nor is the negative argument valid, ‘if not Augustine nor Dionysius nor Damascene, therefore no one’ [nn.208-218]; for the authority of the Church is sufficient, because Augustine On the Morals of Manichaeans [actually Against the Letter of Manichaeus they call Fundamental ch.5 n.6] says, “I would not believe the Gospel unless I believed the Church” [more correctly: “But I would not believe the Gospel unless the authority of the Catholic Church moved me”].

c. To the Second Reason

258. To the next reason [nn.219-229], which proceeds from the same middle term, namely that nothing is to be posited in vain, I say that although God could, of his absolute power, cause the grace that is the principle effect of baptism, and could also cause the other proper effects assigned to character, namely to assimilate etc. [nn.220, 199], without the sort of absolute form that is set down as ‘character’, yet he is bound, of his ordained power, to cause those effects congruently to the mediating form, for the reasons already stated [n.247-249].

259. And then in response to the argument: when it is said ‘either it is a disposition on the part of what undergoes or of what acts’ [n.221], I say not on the part of what acts, as if it were a certain agent in the middle between what acts first and what undergoes; for I do not posit the character to have some active virtue with respect to causing grace, but only that God is present to it as to an invisible sign for the causing of the grace that it signifies (on the departure of impediment or inhering obstacle). Character as disposition, then, is on the part of the receiver, because it is a prior form without which the later form is not received; not indeed because it is the idea of what receives in respect of the later form, but because it is present first before the later is - not simply necessarily, but necessarily when compared to the power of the agent that causes both forms.

260. And when it is said further that the effect of baptism could be had through true penance [n.223], I say that, according to that opinion [sc. the opinion that posits character], perfect innocence cannot, of ordained penance, be had without such intrinsic form, to which God is present to cause such innocence.

261. As to what is objected about other effects, namely about distinction and assimilation [n.224], the answer is plain: although absolutely distinction and assimilation could exist through an act that crosses over into the past, yet they exist more perfectly and are more congruent through some form left behind after the act that passes.

262. Likewise to the point about obligating and configuring [n.225], because if a man who receives the homage of another, or a prelate who receives another into profession, could impress some form on the one obligated, he would do this rather than that the other were absolutely obligated to him through a past act. Now God can impress on the soul such a configuring form, that is, a form showing obligation.

263. Now as to what is added about the commemorative sign [n.226], I say that it is commemorative not only because of those in respect of whom it has the idea of a sign that leads to the idea of the one signed (as is argued by the disjunction [n.226]), but it has the idea of commemorative sign because of him who receives it. And yet if it is posited because of others, it would not only be something commemorative in itself of the sacrament, but it would also be a sign leading to it, as another sign is said to be that makes something come to knowledge; it can also be conceded that [it would be a sign making something come to knowledge] in comparison to God and neighbors, whether in beatitude for glory or in damnation for confusion.

264. And as to what is objected, that God could recognize a lamb without a sign [n.228], it is not a problem, because he can also know the lamb with a sign as well. The blessed also and the damned can know the lamb signed which they would not know unsigned, because in beatitude it is for greater glory and in damnation for greater confusion [cf. Revelation 7.4, Ezechiel 9, 4-6].

265. And when objection is raised about faith and charity or about merits [nn.227-228], it will be spoken of in response to the second main argument [n.277].

266. But as to the objections made there [n.229] about Christ and his Mother, that the character is of no advantage to the blessed for glory, they can be solved, because, just as in created nature there are some perfections that are not simply so but are in such a nature, because they are perfections that supply for imperfection, so can it be said about this [character], that it is a perfection supplying for an imperfection, and so does not belong to one [sc. Christ] who is altogether perfect; nor too does it belong to the person [sc. Mary and the Patriarchs] in whom is another perfection supplying for the imperfection, which is greater than this one is [sc. than character].

d. To the Third Reason

267. To the third reason [n.230] it can be said that God does confer some gift of his on someone sinning mortally, and in the act in which he sins mortally, because he does not want his sacrament, which is truly received by the one sinning, to be vain; and so he wills to cause some effect there, but not the ultimate effect, because the one sinning is not disposed for it.

268. And when you prove that God cures perfectly [n.231], I concede it, when he cures; but he does not then cure, rather he only disposes or prepares for curing, and I concede that he prepares perfectly.

269. And this is reasonable, because although perhaps, in actions of his good pleasure as to private persons, he not confer his gifts pertaining to the salvation of that person save by perfectly healing that person, however in his universal acts, which are concomitant with his universal remedies (of which sort are the sacraments), it is reasonable that he has ordained the causing of some universal effects along with such remedies, but not the ultimate ones, because not all who receive those remedies are suited for this.

e. To the Fourth Reason

270. By this is plain the answer to the fourth reason [n.232]: I concede that [character] is a gift pertaining to the good of the receiver, and not of the Church.

271. And when you say that such gift is not conferred without the other gifts that perfect such a person [n.232] - this can be conceded in the case of special actions about special persons and in a special way; but not about general actions concomitant with general remedies constituted for the whole human race; for he causes them regularly along with the remedies, lest they be vain.

f. To the Fifth Reason

272. As to the fifth [n.233]; although many things are said about the indelibility of character, and although it is not very useful to recite them, I say in brief that there can be no form different from the soul in the soul that God could not, of his absolute power, destroy (as a posterior from a prior), because in this no contradiction can be found. But a character, if it be posited, is indelible in this way, nor can it be destroyed in this way; because neither can it be destroyed by virtue of some creature (as is plain, because the form is supernatural), nor by divine virtue of its ordained power, because God has ordained to destroy no supernatural form save because of some demerit in him who has it; but, with respect to destroying a character, there can be no demeriting cause; for when it is impressed in an act of sinning mortally, nothing can deserve by demerit that the form [of the character] be taken away.

273. Here note, against Thomas [Aquinas, supra d.1 n.281, ST III q.63 a.5], that one should not posit any supernatural virtue in the sacrament, because that virtue could not be corrupted in the same way he posits the character cannot be destroyed.

II. To the Initial Arguments

274. As to the first initial reason [n.187], the same Thomas [Aquinas, Sent. IV d1 q.2 a.4] concedes that circumcision did not impress a character, and then against him is the argument in that question about the efficacy of the sacrament with respect to grace [supra, d.1 nn.278-282The editors of the Quarrachi edition add: “What Scotus says there about the sacraments of the New Law he now applies also to circumcision.” ⁵²]; for he posits that it only has efficacy with respect to grace because it is an instrument with respect to a certain disposition for grace. I say therefore that it can be conceded about circumcision that some character was impressed there just as in baptism; for it was thus the first door of salvation in the Mosaic Law as baptism is in the New Law.

275. And when it is argued [n.187] that then someone circumcised would not need to be baptized, I deny the consequence.

276. As to the proof [ibid.] I say that it can be conceded that either the character would be of the same idea as the character of baptism or of another idea. But if it is of the same idea, either the character was not impressed by the baptism received by someone circumcised - just as on a subject, who possesses some sort of form, that sort of form is not impressed again, even by a cause that would be of a nature otherwise to impress such a form; and this for the reason that the subject is not in potency but already in act with respect to this form. Or if another character of the same idea were impressed in baptism, nothing unacceptable follows, at least if character be posited to be a relation, as was said about relations in Ord. III d.8 n.24. Or it could be said that the character of circumcision differs from that of baptism as the imperfect from the perfect, in the way that the grace of this [person] differs from the grace of that one, and then in the receiving of baptism a new character would not be impressed on someone previously circumcised, but his first one would be perfected.

277. To the second [n.188] I say that not every perfection in the soul has such a perpetual commemorative sign; but such a sign has that by which he who has the perfection is constituted in some determinate rank in the Church; of this sort are not the virtues (because they are common to all members in any rank) but the sacraments, both the one through which entrance is made into the Church and the others (as the sacraments of confirmation and of ordination), as will be stated in the following question [nn.328-332].

278. To the third [n.189] the answer is plain from the solution of the fifth reason for the preceding opinion [nn.232, 272].

Question Two. Whether the Character is Some Absolute Form

279. Proceeding thus to the second question [n.186], and argument is made thus, that character is not an absolute form:

Because according to the Philosopher in Ethics 2.4.1105b20, “there are three things in the soul, power, passion, and habit.” Character is not a power, as is plain, because it is not naturally in the soul itself; nor is it a passion, because it is an abiding form; nor is it a habit, because a habit is that according to which he who has it can operate well or badly [Ethics 2.5.1106a15-17]; character is not a principle of any good or bad operation: not of a good operation because it can stand along with mortal sin; nor of a bad one, as is plain, because it is a gift of God and an effect of a sacrament. Therefore, if the Philosopher’s division sufficiently exhausts absolute form in the soul, the proposed conclusion follows.

280. Again, if it were an absolute form it could only be placed in the genus of quality. This is plain by running through the other genera: for it is not substance, because it comes after the complete being of substance; nor is it quantity, it is plain, because it is a spiritual and incorporeal form; and so on running through the others. But it cannot be posited to be a quality, which is proved by running through the species of quality [cf. Categories 4.1b25-29, 8.8b26-10a26].

281. Again, an absolute form has some proper operation, but a character does not have any proper operation,     therefore etc     .

282. Besides, any accidental absolute form can be eliminated from that in which it is, because it can be eliminated from the subject by the same thing by which it can be impressed on the subject, at least by God, because from the fact it is posterior to the subject there is no contradiction in its not being present in it; a character is simply indelible;     therefore etc     .

283. To the opposite:

A character is a disposition for grace; but grace is an absolute form; therefore the form also that is a disposition for it will be absolute, for a proper disposition is of the same genus as the form for which it is a disposition.

284. Again, a character is a principle assimilating the one baptized to Christ, or to another who is baptized; but likeness is a unity founded on quality; therefore character is a quality.

I. To the Question

A. The Opinion of Thomas Aquinas

285. Here it is said [Thomas Aquinas, Sent. IV d.4 q.1 a.1; Richard of Middleton, Sent. IV d.5 princ.2 q.1Quarrachi editors: It seems that Scotus gets this view of Aquinas mainly through Richard of Middleton, who embraced it and expounded it at length. ⁵³] that a character is an absolute form.

286. For this are adduced four reasons:

The first is of this sort [Aquinas, ST IIIa q.63 a.4 ad 1; Richard, ibid.]: change is only toward an absolute form, Physics 5.2.225b11; there is change toward a character -as is plain about someone baptized in pretense who receives nothing new in baptism save the character.

287. The second thus [Aquinas, Sent. IV d.4 q.1 a.1, Richard, ibid.]: a relation cannot be the foundation of a relation, because then there would be a process to infinity; but a character is the foundation of many relations, for it is the foundation of likeness (as was argued [n.199]); and also foundation of the relation that ‘sign’ introduces, because a character is a commemorative sign with respect to the received sacrament; it is also a foundation of conformity and obligation to Christ [n.199].

288. Third thus [Aquinas, ST III q.63 a.2, Richard, ibid.]: relation is not a power, either active or passive, because it is a principle neither of acting nor of undergoing; but a character is a power, as that the character of baptism is a passive power by which a man becomes capable of the other sacraments, and the character of Order is an active power for many sacred acts in the Church;     therefore etc     .

289. Fourth thus [Aquinas, Sent. IV d.4 q.1 a.4, Richard, ibid.]: in every sacrament there is caused in the soul of the one who receives the sacrament some relation for action or undergoing, and yet a character is not impressed in every sacrament; therefore a character is not just such relation, therefore it is some absolute form.

B. Rejection of the Opinion

1. Against him who Holds this Opinion from his own Statements

290. Argument against this:

First against the one who holds this opinion from his own statements, because he contradicts himself:

For he himself says [Sent. IV d.4 q.1 a.2, ST IIIa q.73 a.2] that this is the definition of a character: “A character is a sign of communion in the faith and in holy order, given by a hierarch,” or that it is “a sign of communion in divine things and the sacred order of the faithful.” In whatever way it is defined, this way or that, he says that ‘sign’ is placed in the definition of character as the genus.A sign is a relation, because x’s being a sign of y is a relation that x has to y. ⁵⁴

291. From this it is argued that a character cannot be any absolute form, because to the quiddity of an absolute form no respect essentially belongs, because then the quiddity would be for itself and not for itself; nor even can it be said that relation is put there as genus and is not truly a genus because in this way a subject is put in the definition of an accident, but it is plain that a relation is not the subject of an absolute, nor either is it the idea of being receptive.

292. Again, just as ‘more things are not to be posited without necessity’ [n.205, d.1 n.300], so when something is posited precisely because of something else, it is not to be posited more perfectly than is required for that something else, or than could be concluded from that something else, for the further perfection that would be posited would be posited in vain; but there is no necessity that, because of all the things because of which a character is posited, a character should be an absolute perfection; for all those things can also be sufficiently preserved if it is a relative form; therefore superfluously and without reason is it posited to be an absolute form.

293. The minor [sc. ‘there is no necessity that, because of...absolute perfection,’ n.292] will be plain when solving the reasons for the opinion [nn.294ff.].

2. Against the Reasons Brought Forward in the Opinion

a. To the First Reason

294. The first of these reasons takes a false major [sc. ‘change is only toward absolute form’, n.286]. I prove this in two ways: first by reason, second by authority.

295. [By reason] - First thus: a respect cannot come more intrinsically to a foundation than what necessarily follows the foundation when the term is posited, because a respect altogether cannot be in a foundation when the term is bracketed, because then it would not be a respect but an absolute form. Therefore, if some respect can come from without to a foundation, it follows that it does not necessarily follow the foundation, even when the term is posited; therefore, the respect can be new altogether without newness of foundation or of term; so for its new being there can be a change, because it is not a change to anything absolute.

296. But if you say a respect comes extrinsically to a subject but not to a foundation - this is nothing, because intrinsic relations (as similarity, which follows whiteness and the like) can come extrinsically to a subject, because the foundation comes anew to it; so therefore, if these are intrinsic and the others extrinsic, the difference between them will be in relation to the foundation.Sc. if intrinsic and extrinsic relations can both come extrinsically to a subject, the difference between them must be in something else and not in the subject directly, which something else will be the foundation. ⁵⁵

297. Again, a natural agent cannot act newly unless something new is posited either in it or in the passive thing undergoes it, or a new relation is posited between them (this is plain, because all things that are related uniformly will have action uniformly, since such agent acts by necessity of nature); therefore if some natural agent has some new action, there will be either some absolute form in the agent before the new action, or some new form in the passive subject, or some new relation of the agent to the passive subject. But neither the first nor the second is necessary, for fire can newly act on wood without the fact that, before the action, the fire or the wood receive a new form, because the first absolute form that the wood receives is there through this action [sc. the form of being ash or cinders is received by the wood through the action of burning]; therefore by this action there is a new relation there of the fire to the wood without any newness of absolute form.

298. This is plain by experiment, because when an active thing is disposed in the same way according to its active form, and the passive thing is disposed in the same way according to its proximate passive potency, if there were some impediment interposed between them, the agent will not act on the passive thing; but when the impediment or obstacle is removed, it will act; therefore a new relation of agent to passive thing is present there without a new absolute form.

299. [By authority] - This is proved from the Philosopher’s intention in Physics 5.2.225b11-13, because although he deny being moved is in the genus of ‘to something’, insofar as to the genus ‘to something’ belong relations that arise intrinsically [cf. Ord. III d.1 n.54], yet he does not deny that motion or change is in the genus ‘to something’ arising intrinsically, rather he concedes it; for he concedes that motion is properly in the genus ‘where’ [cf. Ord. III d.1 n.61], and yet ‘where’ is only a certain respect of the circumscribing body to the located thing or is the circumscribing body.

b. To the Second Reason

300. The second reason too [n.287] has a false major, namely that ‘a relation cannot be founded on a relation’, because according to Euclid Elements of Geometry V def.4, ‘proportionality is a likeness of two proportions’: therefore on a proportion, which formally states a relation, or on its unity, is founded a likeness.

301. And if you argue that ‘likeness is unity in quality’ Metaphysics 5.15.1021a9-12, I say: although in one way ‘what’ is appropriated to the genus of substance, and in the same way ‘same’ and ‘diverse’ (which follow something insofar as ‘what’ is founded on substance), and although ‘equal’ is founded on unity of quantity (taken strictly), ‘like’ on unity of quality - yet taking them in another way ‘what’ is found in every genus, taking the idea of genus very precisely, and ‘what sort of’ is found in every genus (taking form in that genus in the idea of form), and ‘quantity of virtue’ is found in every genus; and so there is found, in this way, in every genus ‘one’, ‘like’, and ‘equal’. For in this way things possessing relations of one species can be said to be alike according to the unity of one relation, just as things possessing one substantial form can be said to be alike according to substance or according to species.

302. And as to what is said [n.262] about the second relation, which is founded on character, namely ‘sign’, I say that if, according to Augustine On Christian Doctrine II ch.1 n.1, “a sign is what, besides the knowledge that it brings to the senses, makes something else come to knowledge” (which is true not only of a sensible sign, taking ‘sense’ strictly for bodily sense, but is true also when taking ‘sense’ generally for cognitive power) - therefore, taking ‘sense’ in this other way for cognitive power, I say thus that there is nothing from the knowledge of which one could come to the knowledge of something else (at least as this is from knowledge of a posterior to a prior), without that posterior thing being able to be called a sign. And thus I concede that on a real relation can be founded the relation of sign to something prior; but such relation not only leads to knowledge of itself but also of something else.

303. And in this way, if someone were to see ‘paternity’ in its foundation, it could be a commemorative sign of a past act of generation. And this is the way it is in the matter at hand.

304. And especially is this not unacceptable, because this relation of sign is only a relation of reason - speaking of a sign instituted at will, of which sort is character with respect to the sacrament or the received sign.

305. As to what is added there [n.287] about the relation of conformity or obligation, it is not cogent; for a religious can, by a vow of religion, be obligated to keeping religion, and he who has done homage can, through the act of doing homage, be obligated to his lord, and in these sort of cases universally [there is obligation] through a preceding promise; and yet there is not there any new absolute form on which the obligation is founded, nor perhaps any relation save one of reason. And so the idea of obligation could be abundantly preserved if it were posited to be a relation of reason, just as filiation in a son could be the idea of some relation to the father (as an obligation to natural love), although it would be possible for it to be filiation alone.

306. And to the proof that then there would be a process to infinity in relations [n.287], it is not valid of real relations, because there is an ultimate relation on which another real relation cannot be founded - just as there is an ultimate accident in beings that cannot be a further subject for another accident; and therefore it does not follow that, if an accident can be in an accident, there is a process to infinity in accidents. However, I readily concede about relations of reason that there can be a process to infinity, because any relation at all, whether real or of reason, can further found another relation of reason.

c. To the Third Reason

307. The third reason [n.288] either equivocates over ‘power’ or contains a false proposition.

For if ‘power’ be taken simply for some act that, without the power, simply could not be obtained, I deny that character is thus a power; for he who is baptized has power simply for no act for which he did not have power when unbaptized, and this whether speaking of an act for which he has power actively or of an act which he receives in some way from another, for in this way someone not baptized could be anointed with chrism just like someone baptized, and he could thus be washed just like someone baptized.

308. But if we speak of the power of ministry, that is, the power by which he is a suitable minister of some principal agent (and without that power he would not be a suitable minister of that principal agent), there is no need that that power be an absolute form, but it is enough in many cases that it be only a relation of reason.

309. The proof of this is according to them [Aquinas, Sent. IV d.24 q.3 a.2], because they do not say that the episcopacy is an order beyond the priesthood, and yet a bishop has a ministerial power of a sort that a non-bishop does not have. For he is a suitable minister in an act God assists with, as in the act of ordaining, and God would not assist similarly if someone else, a non-bishop, were to carry out a similar act. Likewise, if an appointed judge pass a sentence, the sentence holds; but it would not have held before, because a sentence passed by its non-judge is null.

310. Nor yet does this judge or that bishop have any real absolute form, nor perhaps a relative form, save only one of reason.

311. For by that relation of reason by which he is appointed judge by the prince, the will of the prince ratifies the sentence passed by him, and wills it be observed; but he does not ratify the sentence of another who has not been appointed judge, nor does he will it to be observed. And so the judge, by that relation to the will of the prince, has in respect of the prince (as principal agent) a ministerial power for suitably carrying out some act ministerially that, without such relation, he could not suitably carry out.

312. And much more could a real relation, were it present, be posited to be this sort of power of suitably carrying out some act ministerially. For it is plain that a son, because he is a son, can have some authority for carrying out some act in his father’s house that a non-son does not have, and again a nephew [can have authority] for some act but an inferior one; and this power, in authority this way or that, of prescribing or commanding, is only kinship or sonship.

313. In this way is the response clear to the powers about which in particular the argument is.

For the power of ordaining and confirming, if it is an active power, is only for ministering suitably in such an act for such a lord, so that the lord himself, operating principally, may assist with the ministerial act in the way he would not assist with such ministry shown by another.

Now the baptismal character, if it is posited to be a passive power, is not simply passive, either as being receptive or as being the idea of receiving, for nothing absolutely can the soul of someone baptized receive that the soul of someone not baptized cannot receive; but the character is a certain power, relative by way of congruity, from the principal such agent disposing it to act on a passive subject possessing such form and not on any other passive subject.

314. Now such an idea, relative by way of congruity in respect of some principal agent acting voluntarily, can be a relation alone, just as when someone disposes to do something to someone because he is son or kin, and does not want to cause anything similar to one who does not have such relationship.

d. To the Fourth Reason

315. The fourth reason [n.289] destroys the first. For if in the other sacraments there were caused universally a new relation to the action or undergoing of the sacrament and not a character, then there is a new relation there without a new absolute, unless you imagine [Aquinas, Sent. IV d.1 q.1 a4; cf. supra d.1 n.279] that in any other one there is posited some absolute corresponding to character, as for instance some ornament. But if that ornament is a supernatural form it will be indelible in the way that the character is indelible, because it will not be able to have a demeritorious cause. And then it seems to be a fiction: why could it not be said to be a character, since it is a form prior to the principal effect of the sacrament, and an indelible form? Why also will that ornament not be able to have an effect (when pretense ceases) on the other sacraments, as is posited of character in the sacraments that imprint a character?

316. I respond, therefore, that the reason proves nothing save that character is not a relation to the action or undergoing of the sacrament any more than if it were an absolute form. The proof that it is not any absolute form is that in the other sacraments, according to them [Aquinas, Sent. IV d.1 q.1 a.1, ST IIIa q.63 a.2], some absolute form is impressed but a character is not. And thereby can it be said that in any other sacrament there is not impressed any relation that remains after the act; but a character, if it is a relation, remains after the act of baptism received; indeed it remains always.

e. Conclusion

C. Two Doubts as to the Question

318. But there remain two doubts: first about the proximate foundation of the relation; the other, how the characters of diverse sacraments can be distinguished from each other.

1. About the First Doubt

319. About the first, it may seem to someone [Aquinas, Metaphysics 5 lect.17] that the act of reception of the sacrament, when it crosses over into the past, would be the proximate foundation or the proximate idea of founding the relation [n.317].

320. But that is false, especially in the matter at issue, because the idea of founding and the relation are in the same proximate subject (the reception of the sacrament and the character). Even if they be in the same supposit, yet not in the same proximate subject; because the reception of baptism was in the supposit according to the body, the character according to the soul.

321. Now it is generally false here and in other cases, for two reasons;

First, because non-being cannot be the foundation or idea of founding any real relation, because neither can it be the term. For on this account, ‘relation of reason’ is reckoned a contradiction, because it has a negation as foundation or term [cf. Scotus, Praedicamenta, q.25 nn.22-24]; an act crossing over into the past, after it has crossed over, is simply not; therefore after it has crossed over, no new relation is founded on it.

322. The fact, second, is plain because to an immutable term and on an altogether immutable foundation a relation cannot be founded unless it simply necessarily inheres in the foundation - hence if some essence of a creature were simply immutable, its relation to God would be simply immutable; therefore if character state some relation to God (about whom it is plain that he is an immutable foundation), and it is founded on an act as it is past, and the past act as past is simply necessary (insofar as it cannot by absolute divine power be non-past), it follows that that real relation would be altogether immutable, even when speaking of God’s absolute power. But this is unacceptable, because there would be some real relation, different from its foundation, that God could not by his absolute power eliminate from its foundation, as eliminating a posterior from a prior.

323. And these last two proofs [nn.321-322] prove that paternity is not founded on ‘having generated’.

324. And if you bring against this the remark in Metaphysics 5.15.1021a21-25 [“‘father’ is so called by the fact he generates”], I reply that an act could be the cause in the coming to be of the relation (and indeed, when the cause was, then the relation was coming to be present), but it is not a cause of the relation’s being present, just as it does not remain while the relation does; but a foundation is not only cause of coming to be present but also of being present.

325. What then is the foundation of paternity?

I say that the proximate foundation is the very generative power, not when speaking of the respect that power of itself states, but of the absolute that is denominated by the respect.

326. I say therefore, by way of similarity to the matter at hand, that if character is a real relation, its proximate foundation is the bare soul itself (but whether a power or the essence will be discussed in the following question [nn.371-372]); because a respect that arises extrinsically can be founded on a foundation whose principles it in no way leaves, nor need its proximate foundation be in any way determined for it by its own proper idea (because then the respect would not arise extrinsically), but is only determined for it by the very agent; so it is in the matter at hand.

2. About the Second Doubt

327. To the second doubt [n.318] I say that just as, if character were reckoned an absolute form, characters would be said to be distinguished from each other formally, so, if they be posited to be those respects, although they could be distinguished extrinsically from what is extrinsic, yet they are distinguished from each other formally.

328. But if you ask, ‘why then are there only three characters?’,Namely the characters of the sacraments of baptism, confirmation, and holy orders. ⁵⁶ I say (because I will not make special mention of this in the matter about confirmation or of orders) that this is plain in these polities that are worldly. For no one has a determinate rank in the family of a king because he eats or drinks, or because after an offense the lord is reconciled to him, or because he multiplies persons in the polity; for these common acts can exist in everyone in any rank at all; but someone has a rank when he is received into the family of the lord, another when he advances further and is constituted a soldier for defending the republic, another when he is constituted a superior under the lord for constituting others in determinate ranks in his family - as for instance an official general or immediate under the lord, to whom is committed a general authority for receiving others into the family of the lord.

329. And therefore if a name were imposed that signified rank in the family or dignity or bailiwick, someone would not be said to have rank or dignity because coming to the dining table or married or returning to grace after an offense; but he who was taken up from the people into the family of the lord would be said to have a rank, and he a further rank who would be constituted in the family for defending the house, and he a further rank in the family who would be constituted as superintendent for receiving others into the family and instructing an inferior.

330. So is it in the issue at hand; three sacraments (namely eucharist for spiritual nourishment, matrimony for bodily procreation, penance for reconciliationScotus oddly does not mention here the fourth sacrament of the seven, namely extreme unction or the sacrament of the sick, perhaps because it is implied under the sacrament of penance. ⁵⁷) constitute someone in no definite rank in the Church; rather they can be common to every member of the Church in any rank whatever.

331. But the first rank in the Church and the most universal is to be received into the family of Christ, which happens in baptism; the second special one is to be constituted a soldier for the defense of the Christian faith, which happens in confirmation; the third is to be constituted a father and pastor for introducing others into the Church and for instructing and directing others in the Church, which happens in orders.

332. And just as in the polity [n.328] it is not fitting for the three dignities to be repeated, namely reception into the family, promotion to the military, and superintendence as to doctrine, but nutrition and procreation and reconciliation [n.329] can well be repeated, - so in the issue at hand, it is not proper for the three orders to be repeated, but the others are repeated; and in those that are not to be repeated an unrepeatable rank is acquired and a character said to be conferred; not in the ones that are not to be repeated.

D. Scotus’ own Opinion

333. To the question it can be said that, just as it cannot be proved that any real form is impressed in the reception of baptism that is other than grace and the virtues (and this neither by natural reason nor by reason evident from manifest things believed), so it cannot be proved that a character, if a real form is posited, is an absolute form, real or relational; for both views can be saved: that it is a relational form (as was already shown [nn.290-292]), or that it is an absolute form (if it is posited it cannot be evidently disproved).

334. For certain things are rationally enough to be conceded about character, if it be posited to exist: as that it is a simple form, spiritual and impressed by God on anyone who receives a non-repeatable sacrament; and that by divine institution it efficaciously signifies the grace of the sacrament; and that it disposes for it (as was made clear in the preceding question [n.259], because it is in the same receptive subject and from the same agent, and is a prior and more imperfect form); and that it is indelible, since it does not have a corruptive demeritorious cause; and that it is a commemorative cause with respect to the reception of the sacrament that went before, and a configuring sign, that is, a sign signifying the soul’s obligation to Christ; that it is also a sign making one like another who has received the sacrament, and distinguishing one from another who has not received it. All these things, which are seen to be rationally conceded about character (if it be posited to be a real form) can be preserved if it is posited to be a real respect in the way aforesaid [n.333], or if it is a real absolute form. But if it is posited to be a real respective form, it was said before [n.326] how the above things will be preserved and of what sort the respect is, that it is a respect that arrives extrinsically. But if it is posited to be an absolute form, it is necessary to say that it belongs to the genus of quality, and it is not necessary to determine how all the above conditions agree with it, because it is sufficiently clear.

E. Doubt as to Scotus’ own Opinion

335. But then there is a doubt as to what species of quality it should be put in.On the four kinds of quality, see Aristotle Categories 8.8b26-10a26. The first kind is habits and dispositions; the second natural capacities and incapacities (healthy, sickly, hardness, softness); the third kind is the sensible qualities (sweet, bitter, black, white etc.); the fourth kind is figure and shape. ⁵⁸

1. Consideration of the Diverse Opinions or Solutions

a. About the First Solution

336. It is said [Richard of Middleton] that because it is a supernatural quality it is not necessary for it to be put in the genus of quality (which is proved through the Philosopher Metaphysics 10.10.1058b11-12, “Corruptible and incorruptible differ by more than genus”); natural and supernatural differ more than corruptible and incorruptible, because corruptible and incorruptible are contained under a single member of the division, namely natural; therefore much more do natural and supernatural differ more than in genus.

337. To the contrary:

Faith, hope, and charity are certain supernatural things, and yet they are conceded [Bonaventure, William of Ware, Peter of Tarentaise] to be properly in the genus of quality.

338. This same thing appears in another way, because natural and supernatural are not conditions save in comparison to the agent; but comparison to an agent does not vary something as to its being in a genus, because something is put in a genus by its formal proper quiddity, relation to an agent being bracketed.

339. Nor is the statement of the Philosopher in the Metaphysics [n.336] compelling, because he is speaking of physical genus, for in this way no two things are of the same genus unless they are mutually changeable; but the same logical genus can well contain many things that do not belong to the same physical genusAn interesting remark that can usefully be used to understand Scotus’ notorious claim that ‘being’ is a univocal concept; for it can thus be a univocal concept logically while an analogical one physically or really. ⁵⁹ - it is plain about corporeal and incorporeal substance, and corporeal and spiritual quality.

b. About Other Possible Solutions

340. In another way it is said [Richard of Middleton, William of Ware, Peter of Tarentaise] that, according as it is a principle of configuring, it can be put in the fourth species; according as it is a principle of assimilating, it can be put in the third species; and as it is a power, in the second species; and as it is a disposition for grace, in the first as a disposition but, insofar as it is immovably permanent, in the same species as a habit.

341. But this is not valid, because although it could have many properties according to which it is assimilated to the forms of the diverse species of quality, yet it cannot in itself be so many quidditatively; for it is in itself only one quiddity simply; therefore it will be in only one species.

342. However this statement [n.340] could have some probability about one other opinion, because in truth the division of quality into four species is not properly of a genus into species but is only according to diverse modes agreeing with diverse qualities. And perhaps to the same quality in itself in its essence there could belong several modes that are posited as proper to diverse qualities.

c. About another Peculiar Possible Solution

343. In another way it is said [opinion reported and rejected by Bonaventure and Aquinas] that it is in the fourth species of quality, because it is a certain spiritual figure.

344. But this is nothing, because nothing is placed in a genus through metaphorical properties, otherwise Christ would truly be in the genus of inanimate substance (for he is metaphorically called ‘rock’ [I Corinthians 10.4]), and in the genus of irrational animal (because he is said metaphorically to be a ‘lion’ [Revelation 5.5]), and in the genus of quality (because he is said to be ‘light’, “I am the light of the world,” [John 8.12]). But from metaphors is to be collected the proper condition of a thing in itself, and according to this condition must it be placed in genus and species; for in this way could ‘intelligible species’ be put in the fourth species of quality, because it configures the soul to the very subject [sc. of thought].

2. Scotus’ own Solution

345. I respond, therefore, that if character be posited as an absolute accident, it can be put in the second species of quality or also in the first.

346. And neither of these can be evidently disproved.

For if it is argued [Bonaventure] that character is not a power because it is supernatural and that to the second species belongs only natural power - this is a nothing, because although the Philosopher was only speaking of natural power by way of exemplification, howeverThe Vatican editor’s punctuation of the Latin here, which seems misleading, has been altered in the translation. ⁶⁰ a spiritual power, if it is absolute and accidental and spiritual, can well be reckoned to belong to the same intermediate genus, under quality, as natural power, just as also supernatural habit is reckoned to belong to the same intermediate genus as natural habit.

347. Also if it be posited to be the first species, as a habit, because it is movable with difficulty - this cannot be disproved.

348. Even if it be argued against this [Aquinas, Sent. IV d.4 q.1 a.1] that it is a supernatural power, therefore not a habit (and the consequence is proved by way of likeness, because a natural power is not a natural habit); and second, because it is a disposition for grace therefore it is not a habit; and third, because every habit disposes to acting well or badly (Ethics 2.5.1106a15-17), but character does not; fourth, because every habit disposes to facility of action (Ethics 2) - these are not probative:

349. Not the first [n.347] because a supernatural power, that is, a supernatural form, movable with difficulty can well be a principle of acting or of resisting what is corruptive of it, and thus have the idea of supernatural power. Nor is the likeness [n.348] valid, because a natural habit states a certain induced facility over and above the natural power, because a natural power is that whereby we are naturally able to do the acts we can do; but a supernatural power can be an immovable spiritual form, and to this extent can be called a habit, yet it is a principle whereby we can do such spiritual or supernatural act.

350. The second [n.348] is not compelling, because one habit can well be the disposition for another habit, just as, according to those who distinguish the habit of the principle from the habit of the conclusion, the habit of the principle disposes to the habit of the conclusion; neither is a disposition, as distinguished from a habit, for this reason in the first species, for it is a quality easily movable, by contrast with a habit.

351. Third, about acting well or badly [n.348], this is not necessary, because there can be an indifferent habit; for thus, from frequent acting absolutely, an aptitude is acquired for acting by such action with neither goodness nor badness, just as neither was or is the generative act of such sort, namely bad or good. And this is clear: for someone, who is frequently considering a geometrical conclusion, can have an extensive aptitude for considering a conclusion in that science, and the habit there is not good or bad, just as neither is the act from which it was being generated. And so can it be in a supernatural habit.

352. And if you say [Aquinas, Sent. IV d.4 q.1 a.3 ad 1] that a supernatural habit is not such, because it is given for the perfection of the receiver - I reply that this sort of supernatural habit can be a disposing for a good act, though it not be the proximate or sufficient principle elicitive of it; and in this way infused faith is not a sufficient principle of eliciting an act of believing, nor infused charity of eliciting an act of loving, but they incline (when the other necessary things concur) so that a good act be elicited. I say thus that some supernatural habit can incline rather remotely and imperfectly to a good act; and such is character posited to be, as first and very remotely disposing to good acts.

353. The fourth [n.348], about facility, has no validity, because it is not true save of an acquired habit; for an infused habit does not bestow facility for act, as is plain in a recent convert for whom it is not easy after conversion to elicit good acts but difficult, until from a frequency of good acts he will have acquired some acquired virtue.

II. To the Initial Arguments on Both Sides

354. To the arguments for both sides:

To the first [n.279]: if it be posited to be an absolute form, it can be called either a power or a habit, according to the two ways already stated [nn.346-347].

355. To the second [n.280], it is plain what species of quality it would be put in and how [nn.336-345].

356. To the next [n.281]: quantity is an absolute form, and yet it is not posited to be active. Therefore,                 it is necessary to explain that it has an operation with respect to which it is a sufficient principle, or that it in some way is disposed to operation. And so I concede in the issue at hand that this form is a remote disposition for good operation.

357. As to the fourth [n.282] the answer is plain from the end of the preceding question [n.272].

358. To the first argument for the opposite [n.283]: it is not unacceptable for some relation to make disposition for an absolute form, speaking of disposition not in respect of a natural agent nor of a disposition that is the idea of a receptive subject, but of a suitable disposition in respect of a supernatural agent, that is, a disposition by which he who has it is suitably of a nature to be acted on by such supernatural agent; because also in this way a relation can be a disposition in respect of any voluntary agent - just as when someone willingly has a son as suitable object of some action, but someone foreign to such relation, although equal in everything absolute, does not have [such relation] for suitable object of action.

359. To the next about likeness [n.284], it is plain how a likeness is not only founded on quality as it is a distinct genus, but as the idea of it is found generally in all forms; for in this way someone mentally crucified can be said to be like Christ bodily crucified, and the like.

Question Three. Whether Character is in the Essence of the Soul or in Some Power of It

360. Proceeding thus to the last point [n.195], and argument is made that character is not in the essence of the soul as in the proximate subject.

Because a disposition and the form for which it disposes have the same proximate subject; a character is a proximate disposition for faith, but faith is in the intellect.

361. To the contrary:

From the same major [n.360] together with this minor, that character is a proximate disposition for grace; but grace is in the essence of the soul, because it is its first and second life [sc. natural life and spiritual life]; it follows therefore that character (which is spiritual life) is in the essence of the soul.

I. To the Question

A. Opinion of Thomas Aquinas

1. Exposition of the Opinion

362. There is here an opinion [Aquinas, Sent. IV d.4 q.1 a.3“Just as grace, which is the principle of spiritual life, is in the essence of the soul as in a subject, so character too, which is a spiritual power, is in the natural power of the soul as in a subject, and not in the essence of the soul.. .save through the intermediary of the power of the soul.” ⁶¹] that just as grace is in the essence of the soul, so a power for grace is in the power of the soul; but character is a power or disposition proximate to grace; therefore, it is in the power of the soul as in its proximate subject. But it is not in every power of the soul, because then it would not be a single form; therefore, it is in a single power, and it is more reasonable to posit that it is in the intellect.

363. The reason for this is that character is for configuring the created trinity to the Uncreated Trinity; but the created trinity, or the ‘image’, consists principally in the intellect, because from it, as from the root, arises the will.

2. Rejection of the Opinion

364. On the contrary, because a disposition for form should never be put in a receptive subject that is posterior to form (this is plain by running through individual forms and their dispositions [cf. Averroes Sufficientia I ch.10]); but character is a disposition for grace, as you concede [n.362], and grace is in the essence of the soul for you [n.362, ST I-IIa q.110 a.4]; therefore character cannot be in any receptive subject posterior to the essence of the soul; but, for you, a power is posterior to the essence of the soul, because it is an accident [Aquinas, Sent. I d.3 q.4 a.2].

365. Nor is the stated reason or the consequence valid whereby it is said, ‘grace is in the essence of the soul, therefore a power of disposition for grace is in a power of the soul’ [n.362]; rather the opposite follows, namely that the receptive subject itself of grace is the receptive subject of the disposition, or at any rate the disposition cannot be in any subject posterior to that in which the form is.

366. This is also plain in other things, because a supernatural habit is not in a natural habit, but in the natural power in which is the natural habit, and this for the reason that a natural power is prior to both habits.

367. Again, his proof by which it is proved that grace is in the essence of the soul immediately [n.362] is not probative, because a natural perfection is present in someone before a supernatural power is, for a natural and intrinsic perfection follows at once the nature of what is perfectible by it; although it be an accident according to him [n.364], yet it is an intrinsic perfection of the soul itself; therefore the power is naturally in the soul before grace is, and consequently it could have the idea of receptive subject.

368. Nor is the argument about life [n.362 fn., 361] probative, because spiritual life is first in the soul as it is joinable to God; hence, according to Augustine City of God XIX chs.16, 18, God is for this reason said to be the life of the soul, because the life of the soul is only in its conjunction with God as with its object; but the soul is not joinable to God in idea of object save through a power.

369. As to what he afterwards adds about the will, that it arises from the intellect [n.363], I ask: either the intellect has to the will only the priority of generation or origin, and in this way perfection in the intellect with respect to the will is not proved but rather imperfection is, because universally the more imperfect things precede the more perfect things in order of generation, Metaphysics 9.8.1050a4-5 [Aquinas, Metaphysics 9 lectio 8, Scotus Ord. I d.5 n.130]; but if you mean that the intellect is prior or root with respect to the will as eminently or virtually containing the will, this is refuted from what has been said [here supra], because what is ordered to another as prior in origin does not contain the other eminently or virtually; but an act of intellect is ordered essentially to an act of will

370. And if you deny this, dispute about it has to be in the material on beatitude, below [Ord. IV d.49 p.1 qq.4-5].

B. Scotus’ own Opinion

371. I say therefore to the question, taking as supposed what was said in Ord. II d.26 nn.24-26, namely that grace is the same as charity and is consequently first in the power, namely in the will, and further, along with these, that a disposition for form is in the same receptive subject as the form, and that character, if it be posited to exist, is suitably posited to be a disposition for sacramental grace (as was shown in the solution of the preceding question about character in its first congruence [n.247]) - therefore it is fitting to put character formally in the will.

372.From here to the end of the question the Vatican editors do not number the paragraphs. I have added numbers on my own account. ⁶² And there is a confirmation for this, that if character is a sign or foundation for the obligation of the soul to God [n.334], it is reasonable that it be put in the power to which first belongs being obligated or being the idea of obligating. But such is the will, because through its act precisely does anyone principally obligate himself; for the things that concur there on the part of the intellect or another power in man are only certain preambles for firmness of willing, which is proposing or vowing reasonably or certain signs manifesting that the willing is firm.

II. To the Initial Argument

373. As to the argument for the opposite side [n.360], it is plain that character is not the proximate disposition for faith as it is faith, but it is a disposition for the perfection that principally conforms the whole soul to God, and this is grace, which is the same as charity and is in the will, as was said [n.371].

III. To the Reason for Thomas Aquinas’ Position

374. To the reason for the other position [of Aquinas, n.363]: although it badly prove that character is in a power of the soul [n.369], yet I concede this because of the other antecedent that he accepts [n.362], namely that the form for which it disposes is in a power, and I concede that it is in one power and in that power which is more principal in the Image and in whose configuring consists principally the whole configuring of the soul or of the Image to the Trinity.